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In this study, we analyze two new potential determinants for mitigating fraud committed by firms: 
institutional investors and political connection. The role of institutional investors in the effective 
monitoring of firm management has also been well established and we in turn observe that firms with 
a large proportion of institutional investors have lower incidences of corporate fraud. The importance 
of political connection for enterprise in both developed and emerging markets such as the United 
States and China has also been established by prior studies. We find in this paper that it is possible to 
identify another positive effect on enterprise in that political connection could reduce incidences of 
corporate fraud, thus providing value to firms. We further find that political connection plays more 
pronounced role in reducing the incidence of regulatory enforcement against non-state owned 
enterprises in weaker legal environments, while institutional ownership plays a more important role 
in reducing the incidence of regulatory enforcement against state owned enterprises in weaker legal 
environments. 
JEL Classification: G15, G18, K22  
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Media reports of fraud carried out by the management of large corporations and financial 
institutions (e.g., Enron, Lehmann Brothers) arouse public attention and influence investor 
confidence as these cases bring into question the integrity of other firms and their executives 
who have gained the trust of the public and more significantly, their investors. Corporate and 
financial frauds have also been well documented in the finance and accounting academic 
literature as it is interesting to analyze what went wrong and how such frauds could potentially 
be avoided in the future to protect existing and future investors. These prior studies, mostly using 
US data, show that a number of factors are associated with the incidence of fraud, especially 
factors related to corporate governance (Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; Dechow et al., 1996; 
Uzun et al., 2004). 
In the examination of the accounting and auditing enforcement actions by Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the U.S. (SEC), Beasley (1996) shows that the incidence of financial 
statement fraud is negatively related to proportion, tenure and share ownership of outside 
directors. Uzun et al. (2004) find similar results for proportion of independent outside directors 
using the corporate fraud cases collected from the Wall Street Journal. Dechow et al. (1996) and 
Beasley et al. (2000) report that an audit committee helps minimize fraud. However, a study by 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) suggests that the likelihood of earnings misstatement is lower only 
if at least one outside director on the board and on the audit committee has accounting or finance 
background. Chen et al. (2006) examine the impact of ownership structure and boardroom 
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characteristics on corporate financial fraud in China and they find that the proportion of outside 
directors, number of board meetings and tenure of chairman are also significant factors in 
explaining the incidence of fraud. A few studies have further examined the reaction of 
enforcement actions on fraud. Ding et al. (2010) study the dynamics between enforcement 
actions and the responses from both the board of directors and supervisory boards. Jia et al. 
(2009) find that supervisory boards play an active role when firms face enforcement action in 
China while Hou and Moore (2011) examine the effect of state ownership on China’s regulatory 
enforcement against fraud. Chen et al. (2005) show that there is a negative stock price reaction 
for the announcement of enforcement actions.  
Following the extant literature, we introduce two new potential determinants of mitigating 
the incidence of fraud by firms: proportion of institutional investors and political connection. 
Like many of the studies listed above, we do this by analyzing data from Chinese firms. We do 
this for the following reasons. Both agency theory and empirical evidence suggest that ownership 
structure affects the incentives to monitor and control management (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1994; Tirole, 2001). In particular, it has been suggested that 
large shareholders such as institutional investors are more effective in monitoring firm 
management (Franks and Mayer, 2001; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
The Chinese government within the last decade has made concerted efforts to increase 
institutional ownership within Chinese firms. With increased levels of institutional investor 
ownership in Chinese firms, institutional investors are incentivized to monitor investee firms 
closely and to curb the incidence of corporate fraud. We argue that firms with a large proportion 
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of institutional investors tend to have lower incidences of fraud. 
While the Chinese government has made a strategic decision to cultivate institutional 
investors in China, political connection is still undoubtedly prevalent in that emerging market. 
The growing body of research into the impact of political connections find that political 
connections are valuable, as ties with the government help firms to gain comparative advantages, 
which enhance firm performance and value (Fan et al., 2008; Fisman, 2001; Goldman et al., 
2009; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Li et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2012). Such advantages include 
access to key resources, including bank loans granted at favorable terms (Charumilind, Kali, and 
Witwattanakantang 2006; Claessens et al., 2008), favorable tax treatment (Adhikari et al., 2006; 
Faccio, 2006), a higher IPO offering price (Francis et al., 2009), and government bailouts during 
financial distress (Faccio et al., 2006). We argue that political relation is a personal asset that is 
based on reputational capital and therefore it is in the interest of the politically connected CEO or 
Chairman to maintain his or her reputation by increased monitoring of the firm managers or by 
using his or her political clout to obtain privileges to maintain firm value. Chen et al. (2005) 
contend that enforcement actions reduce firm value. Firms with political connections are more 
likely to have lower incidences of fraud. 
Using 966 enforcement announcements made by firm regulators, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 
2003 through 2011, we examine how proportion of institutional ownership and political 
connection may or may not mitigate the incidence of corporate fraud in firms. In China, the 
CSRC is responsible for both the investigation of accusations of corporate fraud carried out by 
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listed firms and securities firms and the enforcement of securities regulation for listed firms, 
securities firms and stock exchanges. Violations of securities regulations are published in the 
media (e.g., Securities Times and Shanghai Securities Daily) as designated by the CSRC. The 
types of violations include illegal share buybacks, inflated profits, assets fabrication, 
unauthorized change in fund use, violation in capital contribution, shareholder embezzlement, 
price manipulation, illegal guarantee and speculation. The violations may involve the firm, 
management and shareholders. Enforcement actions include fines, public criticism, 
administrative punishment, warning and delisting. We find that the firms with a larger proportion 
of institutional investors and political connected firms are less likely to face enforcement action 
in China. 
Furthermore, we investigate how state ownership (the most obvious of political connections) 
affects the association between the political connection and incidence of fraud. Wu et al. (2012) 
argue that compared with politically connected managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
politically connected managers in private non- SOEs will help firms gain privilege or favorable 
treatment from the government more significantly. We believe a similar inference may be made 
regarding the treatment of potential regulatory violations. As such, we carry out regressions with 
partitioned samples between SOEs and non-SOEs. We find that political connection plays a more 
important role in reducing the incidence of fraud among non-SOEs, while the effective 
monitoring carried out by institutional investors is more pronounced for SOEs in reducing the 
incidence of corporate fraud. 
We also seek to determine whether the institutional environment could play a role in the 
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incidence of fraud among firms with political connections and among firms with higher levels of 
institutional ownership. Following prior studies, we use the widely used market development 
index compiled by Fan et al. (2010) to capture the regional differences in institutions in China 
(Wang et al., 2008). We find that political connection and institutional investors play a more 
important role in reducing the incidence of fraud within weaker legal environments. 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. The next section briefly reviews 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research design and sample 
characteristics. The empirical results are discussed in section 4. Conclusions are presented in the 
last section. 
 
2. Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1 Institutional shareholders  
An increasingly important external control mechanism affecting governance worldwide is 
the emergence of institutional investors as equity owners. Gillian and Starks (2003) posit that the 
rise of professional money managers as a large shareholder group in corporations worldwide 
offers the potential for increased monitoring of firm management. Institutional investors have the 
potential to influence management’s activities directly through their ownership (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner, 1994), and potentially indirectly with the threat 
of divesting their shares (Gillian and Starks, 2003). However, only large shareholders have 
sufficient incentives to monitor because all shareholders benefit from the actions of a monitoring 
shareholder without necessarily incurring the added costs. Hartzell and Starks (2003) provide 
 
 6 
empirical evidence suggesting that institutional investors serve a monitoring role with regard to 
executive compensation contracts. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) find that firms with greater 
institutional ownership have larger stock price reactions upon the announcement of anti-takeover 
amendment adoption.  
In the past decade, the Chinese government has cultivated institutional investor ownership in 
Chinese firms. For example, in 2000 CSRC started to accelerate the development of mutual 
funds in domestic stock markets. In 2003, the QFII system was introduced to allow foreign 
investors to invest directly in China’s domestic stock market. Top international investment banks, 
such as Citigroup, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, and Nomura Securities 
promptly applied for, and received, their licenses. The national social security fund and insurance 
companies were allowed to invest in domestic listed firms in 2003 and 2004, respectively. The 
ownership of firms by institutional investors has grown progressively in the past decade, 
especially by mutual funds. According to the CSRC statistics, the total net value of mutual funds  
was US$10 billion by end 2002. As at end 2011, the total net value of mutual funds was over 
US$421 billion (RMB 2651 billion) and there were 70 mutual fund management companies and 
919 mutual funds in China. The mean mutual funds’ ownership in our sample firms represents 
about 7.69% of the total number of A-shares. At the end of 2011, 176 foreign institutions 
obtained the QFII licenses with a combined investment quota of US$42 billion. 
The success of China’s regulatory effort to promote institutional investors (such as mutual 
funds) as a corporate governance mechanism is supported by extant literature. Yuan el al. (2008) 
find that equity ownership by mutual funds has a positive effect on firm performance. Their 
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results are robust to several measures of firm performance and various estimations. This suggests 
that in China institutional shareholders play an important role in monitoring corporate managers. 
The involvement of institutional investors can range from keeping management in line with the 
threat of the sale of shares to the active use of corporate voting rights in proxy contests. Thus we 
expect the monitoring role of the institutional investors to reduce the incidences of corporate 
fraud.  
H1: Institutional investor ownership mitigates the incidence of fraud among investee firms. 
 
2.2. Political connection 
Extant literature tells us that politically connected firms, whose board members, top 
management, or major stockholders have a relationship with someone in government, may 
garner value from governments such as the awarding of licenses, government contracts, bailouts 
for distressed firms, and planning permissions (Charumilind et al., 2006; Dinc, 2005; Faccio, 
Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Fisman 2001; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Khawajia and Mian 2005). Especially in countries with interventionist 
governments and weak protection of property rights, the value of political connections is found 
to be more pronounced (Faccio, 2006). 
Among emerging markets, China is most commonly associated with interventionist 
government and weak protection of property rights. Its legal institutions are regarded as 
government-driven, and not citizen-driven or litigant-driven (Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 
2006). Gong (2004) also points out that China’s judiciary operates as an administrative unit 
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within the political system, with its authority derived from the state rather than from the law. It 
therefore follows that the value of political connection among Chinese firms is palpable. Hiring 
politically connected managers is a feasible and effective way for private firms to overcome 
market- and state-level disadvantages and obtain favorable treatment from the government. 
Following Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007), we define a CEO as politically connected if he or she 
is currently serving or formerly served in the government or military. However, we extend their 
exploration of the political connectedness of CEOs to include Chairmen, as both are important in 
China. To maintain the value of this connection, we believe that politically connected managers 
will also act as an external control mechanism and monitor their companies to ensure that there is 
no erosion of their own personal reputational goodwill. The firm itself will also seek to maintain 
the value of its political connection to ensure continuous favorable treatment and seek to avoid 
regulatory, or governmental, censure. Politically connected managers however may use their 
connections to help their firms to mitigate the potential for enforcement. Political connection can 
bring certain privileges in the regulatory environment, in that enforcement in the form of fines, 
public criticism, administrative punishment, warning and even delisting may be eased or even 
avoided. Based on the abovementioned discussion, we frame our hypothesis as follows:  
H2: Firms with political connections are less likely to face enforcement action in China. 
 
2.3. State Owned Enterprises 
As previous studies have found, the value of political connection is mainly derived from the 
advantage of obtaining key resources from the government (Adhikari et al., 2006; Claessens et 
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al., 2008). SOEs are obviously the most directly politically connected firms. For private firms 
that are non-SEOs, it is clear that more tenuous political connections can put them at a 
disadvantage compared with SOEs, especially in transitional economies, which typically lack 
property rights protection and the market-supporting institutions needed by private firms 
(McMillan, 1995). Retaining politically connected managers is a feasible and effective way for 
private firms to overcome market- and state-level disadvantages and potentially obtain favorable 
treatment from the government and its agencies. 
However, the resource-based value of political connectivity is still likely to be influenced by 
government ownership as limited resources are controlled by the government. SOEs have direct 
ties with the government, and the government ownership link is more explicit and stable than a 
personal, more reputation based link with the government through a politically connected 
manager. Thus, government ownership tempers the monitoring benefits of the politically 
connected managers. Non-SOEs’ having a connected manager will seek to ensure and maintain 
favorable treatment from the government which is not guaranteed as it is not state owned. 
Therefore, in this study we predict that the presence of politically connected managers in 
non-SOEs is more likely to reduce the incidence of fraud than those in SOEs. 
The impact of institutional investor on the reduction of fraud may also be different between 
SOEs and non-SOEs. While private owners tend to seek to maximize their personal wealth, 
SOEs tend to have more strategic, or political objectives, which include maximizing employment 
and wages; promoting regional development; ensuring national security; providing low-prices 
goods and services; and producing unnecessary goods. These political objectives can lead to poor 
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incentives and weak corporate governance for SOEs (Conyon and He, 2011). Thus, non-SOEs 
should have better corporate governance than SOEs. It follows therefore that institutional 
investors will be incentivized to monitor their investments in SOEs more than non-SOEs. 
Consequently, the external monitoring role of institutional investors on reducing frauds should 
be more pronounced for SOEs.  
We hypothesize as follows. 
H3a: Political connection plays more important role in mitigating the incidence of fraud in 
non-SOEs. 
H3b: Institutional ownership plays more pronounced role in mitigating the incidence of 
fraud in SOEs. 
 
2.4. Legal environment 
Many studies argue that a country’s institutional and legal environment, including the 
enactment and enforcement of laws, is crucial for creating sustainable growth and fostering 
entrepreneurial spirit (North 1990). As Faccio (2006) points out, the favorable treatment enjoyed 
by firms with political connections is found to be more pronounced in countries with 
interventionist governments and weak protection of property rights because political connection 
are more likely to bring more privileges under such environment. Thus, we expect that the role of 
political connection in reducing the incidence of regulatory enforcements will be found to be 
more pronounced in regions with the weaker legal environment.  
On the other hand, institutional and legal environment could exert profound influence on the 
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behavior and governance of firms. For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) argue that corporate governance is stronger where the legal system is based on common 
law as opposed to civil law. As Chen et al. (2009) document, better firm-level and 
self-disciplined corporate governance will be more valuable in regions with weak investor 
protection, as investors cannot rely on legal systems alone to monitor the controlling shareholder 
and management. As a firm-level corporate governance mechanism, the role of institutional 
investors is also affected by the legal (investor protection) environment. Thus, we expect that the 
effectiveness of institutional investors in reducing incidences of corporate fraud may be greater 
in regions with weak legal and investor protection. Based on the foregoing discussion, we 
hypothesize that: 
H4a: Political connection plays a more important role in reducing the incidences of 
regulatory enforcements in weaker legal environments. 
H4b: Institutional ownership plays a more pronounced role in reducing the incidences of 
regulatory enforcements in weaker legal environments. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Data and Sample 
We collect 966 regulatory enforcement announcements made by CSRC, Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period 2003-2011. We exclude firms in the 
finance industry. We believe our data includes all cases where fraud is detected, although, as 
noted before, cases of minor infractions are not publicly disclosed. Our sample period begins at 
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2003 because listed firms started to disclose percentages held by institutional investors such as 
mutual funds in 2003. The original data are collected from Winds and CSMAR data. The yearly 
and industry distribution of firms is shown in Panel A and Panel B of Table 1. The industry 
distribution of fraud is representative of the number of listed firms in an industry sector, except 
for the property (real estate) sector, which has a higher incidence of financial fraud. 
In panel C of Table 1, we show the distribution of cases across provinces. Column 1 lists the 
province, column 2 and 3 gives the development and legal score of the province (MINDEX and 
MLEGAL), column 4 shows the number of fraud cases, and column 5 expresses the number of 
fraud cases as a proportion of the total number of listed firms in the province. As panel C shows, 
Shanghai has the highest development score of 10.972. During the period of our study, 53 
enforcement actions were made against firms located in Shanghai and this represents about 4% 
of the listed firms in the city. There is no obvious pattern in panel C. Fraud does not appear to be 
confined to those provinces with higher development scores or to those with lower scores. To 
more formally test this, we use the index of market development (MINDEX) in our multivariate 
analyses. 
****************** 
Table 1 here 
****************** 
The panel A of Table 2 gives a breakdown of the type of violation, using the categories 
supplied by the CSRC. The main violations are postponement or delay in disclosure, major 
information omission and false statements which cover fabrication of facts that appear in 
statements other than accounting reports. In total there are 1449 types of violation for the 966 
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enforcement announcements, so some firms had multiple violations. Panel B shows a breakdown 
of the type of enforcement actions. Some firms had multiple enforcement actions, as in total 
there are 1268 enforcement actions against 966 announcements. About 20% of the penalties 
consist of public condemnation. Monetary fines, the most serious penalty, account for about 18% 
of the sanctions.  
****************** 
Table 2 here 
****************** 
 
3.2. Model Specification 
 To empirically test the predictions in our abovementioned hypotheses, we analyze the 
following probit model on the full sample enforcement announcements: 
FRAUD = β0 + β1POLITICAL CONNECTION + β2INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS  
+ β3LARGEST SHAREHOLDER + β4TOP10 + β5AUDITOR + β6BOARDSIZE  
+ β7 INDEPENDENT + β8SIZE + β9LEV + β10GROWTH + β11LOSS 
+ β12MINDEX+Industry and Year dummies (1) 
where FRAUD is an indicator variable taking the value one if the firm is subject to an 
enforcement action. Institutional investor shareholding and political connection are the main 
experimental variables in our study. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, the proportion of 
institutional investors, is the sum of percentage shares held in a firm by mutual funds, securities 
companies, insurance companies, national social security fund and Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (QFII). If our hypothesis H1 holds, we would expect the coefficient on 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS to be negative. POLITICAL CONNECTION is an indicator 
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variable taking the value one if the firm has retained a politically connected CEO and/or 
Chairman, and zero otherwise. Following Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007), we define a CEO as 
politically connected if he or she is currently serving or formerly served in the government or 
military. However, we extend their exploration of the political connectedness of CEOs to include 
Chairmen, as both are important in China. If our hypothesis H2 holds, we would expect the 
coefficient on POLITICAL CONNECTION to be negative. We also include the following 
controlling variables identified from prior studies. LARGEST SHAREHOLDER is the 
percentage ownership of the firm held by the largest shareholder. TOP10 is a Herfindahl index 
that measures the concentration of shares held by the top 10 stockholders excluding the 







S where Sn is the number of shares held by the nth largest 
stockholder, and S is the number of total outstanding shares. These indicator variables have been 
included in the model to proxy for ownership structure characteristics. AUDITOR is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the auditor of the firm is one of the 10 biggest auditors by 
market share. The auditing profession is relatively new in China therefore there is as yet no 
clearly defined set of ‘well-known’ or ‘prestigious’ auditors. Nevertheless we do attempt to 
partition auditors on the basis of market share by ranking Chinese CPA firms by market share of 
clients’ assets and then identifying the 10 highest. Using market share to measure audit quality is 
very common (DeAngelo, 1981). Chen et al. (2006) also use a Big 10 classification (auditors 
with the ten highest market shares) as a proxy for high audit quality in China. To measure board 
characteristics, we use BOARDSIZE which is the log of number of board members and 
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INDEPENDANT is the percentage of independent directors. The following financial variables 
are also used in the incidence of fraud model. SIZE is the natural log of total assets at the 
beginning of the year, and is used to capture size effects of the fraud. We include LEV to control 
for the ratio of debt to total assets of the firm, which serves as a measure of financial difficulties 
as we believe companies with high levels of leverage are more likely to be investigated by the 
CSRC. We base our belief on Loebbecke et al. (1989) and Bell et al. (1991), who contend that 
firms in financial trouble are more likely to be examined for financial statement fraud. They 
further argue that very rapid growth is an indicator of fraud in the US. To control for growth 
effect, we include GROWTH as an indicator variable, which is the value of annual average sales 
growth in the three years prior to the date of the financial fraud. In China, if a firm records losses 
over two consecutive years, it will be specially treated (“ST”). If a third year of losses is reported 
then trading of the shares will be suspended on the stock exchange. Firms usually try to avoid to 
be specially treated to avoid extra regulatory oversight. LOSS is therefore included as an 
indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm has recorded a loss in each of the prior two 
years.  
A strong characteristic of China’s reform process is the uneven distribution of wealth and 
growth across the different provinces (Demurger et al., 2002). As the degree of market 
development could have an effect on the propensity to commit corporate fraud, it is important 
that we account for this in our model. To accomplish this we use a comprehensive index 
(MINDEX) compiled by Fan et al. (2010) as a proxy of the market development of a province. 
The index captures the regional market development from the following aspects: (1) relationship 
 
 16 
between government and markets, such as the role of markets in allocating resources and 
enterprise burden in addition to normal taxes; (2) the development of non-state business, such as 
the ratio of industrial output by the private sector to total industrial outputs; (3) development of 
product markets, such as regional trade barriers; (4) development of factor markets such as FDI 
and mobility of labor; (5) development of market intermediaries and legal environment such as 
protection of property rights. Higher scores equate to greater market development. We also use 
MLEGAL, the fifth sub-index of MINDEX, which represents the development of market 
intermediaries and legal environment, as a robustness check. Regional rankings based on 
MINDEX and MLEGAL are very similar. 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
The details of the variable construction are found in Appendix A. A list of all of these 
variables, as well as their summary statistics, is provided in Table 3. Approximately 26% of firms 
are politically connected in China. The institutional investors hold more than 8% of shares 
outstanding. As mentioned in an earlier section, institutional investors is the sum of percentage 
shares held by mutual fund, securities companies, insurance companies, social security fund and 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII). Among them, the mutual funds have the highest 
ownership. On average, the largest shareholder holds around 37% of the total outstanding shares. 
The BIG10 auditors in China account for 16% of the market share. The proportion of 





Table 3 here 
****************** 
 
4.2. Regression Results 
We report the results of main regression models in Table 4. We only include those control 
variables in Model 1. We find the ownership of the largest shareholder reduces the likelihood of 
the incidence of. Model 1 shows that there is a negative relationship between proportion of 
independent directors and incidence of fraud. These results suggest that the largest shareholder 
and independent directors play a monitoring role in reducing the likelihood of fraud. Larger firms 
and more profitable firms are less likely to commit fraud. We find that financial leverage (LEV) 
and financial distress (LOSS) have a positive impact on fraud. The coefficients on AUDITOR 
and other variables are not significant. All these results are consistent with prior literature on 
corporate fraud. 
We include our main variable political connection in Model 2. The coefficient of political 
connection is negative and statistically significant. It is consistent with our hypothesis H2 that 
political connection decreases the incidence of regulatory enforcements against firms. It indicates 
that the retaining politically connected CEOs and/or Chairmen can bring certain privileges in the 
regulatory environment, in that enforcement in the form of fines, public criticism, administrative 
punishment, warning and even delisting may be eased. We add the aggregate institutional 
investor ownership in Model 3. The coefficient of institutional investors is negative and 
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statistically significant. It supports our hypothesis H1 that institutional investor monitoring 
decreases the incidence of regulatory enforcement against fraud. It implies that institutional 
investors can potentially play an increasingly important role in the external control mechanisms 
in China. They are effective in monitoring firm management and reducing the likelihood of 
corporate frauds. We then separate institutional investors into different types: mutual fund, 
security companies, insurance companies, social insurance fund and QFII in Model 4. We find 
the coefficient on mutual fund is significant and those on the other institutional investors are not 
significant. It implies that larger mutual fund ownership in firms incentivizes effective 
monitoring. In the latter analysis, we use the ownership of mutual funds as a proxy for 
institutional investors. When we include both political connection and institutional investors in 
Model 5, the coefficients on both variables are significant.  
 
****************** 
Table 4 here 
****************** 
We examine the association between political connection, institutional investors and fraud 
under different ownership in Table 5. We investigate the ownership of listed firms in China based 
on the identity of the largest shareholder, that is, the ultimate owner, following the recent 
literature (La Porta et al., 1999; Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009). We classify our sample based on 
whether the firm is government controlled or not. We find that the coefficient on political 
connection is negative and statistically significant for the Non-SOEs sub-sample while that is not 
significant for SOEs. It is consistent with our hypothesis H3a that political connection plays 
more important role in the incidence of regulatory enforcement against fraud for Non-SOEs. It 
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implies that the value of political connection among SOEs may be diluted by government 
ownership. Additionally, Table 5 also shows that the coefficient on mutual fund is negative and 
statistically significant for SOEs. It lends support to hypothesis H3b that institutional ownership 
plays a more important role in reducing the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud 
for SOEs. The finding suggests that institutional investors may put in greater efforts to ensure 
more effective in monitoring SOEs as Non-SOEs tend to have better corporate governance. 
 
****************** 
Table 5 here 
****************** 
Table 6 reports the results on the issue whether the role of political connection and 
institutional investors is conditional on institutional and legal environment. We partition our 
sample based on the legal environment which is measured by MLEGAL, an index capturing the 
development of the protection of property rights. We find that the coefficient on political 
connection is negative and statistically significant for the firms in weaker legal environments. It 
is consistent with our hypothesis H4a that political connection plays more important role in 
reducing incidence of fraud in weaker legal environment. It also indicates that the favorable 
treatment of firms with political connections is more pronounced in weaker legal environments. 
Table 6 also shows that the coefficients on mutual funds are negative and statistically significant 
for firms in weaker legal environment, whereas those are not significant for firms in stronger 
legal environments. This supports our hypothesis H4b and echoes prior studies that support the 
view that institutional owner monitoring plays a more pronounced role in reducing the 
incidences of fraud weaker legal environments.       
 
 20 
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In this study, we analyze two new potential determinants for mitigating fraud committed by 
firms in China: institutional investors and political connection. For the purposes of this study, we 
measure the incidence of fraud by analyzing the number of enforcement announcements made by 
the CSRC, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2003 through 2011.  
In the past decade, the Chinese government has cultivated institutional investor ownership in 
Chinese firms to take advantage of an increasingly important external control mechanism for the 
monitoring of firm management. We find that the firms with a larger proportion of institutional 
investors, especially mutual fund investors, tend to have lower incidences of fraud. The 
prevalence of politically connected firms in both developed markets like the US and emerging 
markets such as China cannot be ignored. We know that political connection is valued by 
enterprise as it could help firms get privilege or favorable treatment from government. We argue 
however that political relation is a personal asset that is based on reputational capital and 
therefore it is in the interest of the politically connected CEO or Chairman to maintain his or her 
reputation by increased monitoring of the firm managers or by using his or her political clout to 
maintain firm value. Chen et al. (2005) contend that enforcement actions reduce firm value. We 
find that in China, the firms with political connections have lower incidences of fraud, or are less 
likely to face enforcement action. It can be suggested that both Institutional ownership and 
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politically connected firms are effectively monitored.  
One characteristics of capital market in China is that the central or local government and 
wholly SOEs are often the major stockholders in many listed firms. Apart from the concentrated 
ownership by government, there is diverse disparity in the extent of market development and 
legal protection across provincial jurisdictions in China. We argue that government ownership 
and institutional environment could dilute the benefits of monitoring by institutional investors 
and politically connected CEOs and/or Chairmen. We find that political connection plays a more 
important role in reducing the incidence of regulatory enforcement for non-SOEs, while the 
monitoring role of institutional investors for mitigating the incidence of fraud is more 
pronounced for SOEs. We also find that political connection and institutional investor ownership 
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Appendix A Definition of Variables 
 








The percentage ownership by institutional investors. The proportion of institutional 
investors is the sum of percentage shares held by mutual fund, securities companies, 
insurance companies, social security fund and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
(QFII). 
MUTUAL FUND The percentage ownership by a mutual fund as an institutional investor. 
SECURITY 
COMPANY 
The percentage ownership by a security company as an institutional investor. 
INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
The percentage ownership by an insurance company as an institutional investor. 
SOCIAL SECURITY 
FUND 
The percentage ownership by a social security fund as an institutional investor. 
FRAUD A dummy variable taking the value one if the firm is subject to an enforcement action.  
LARGEST 
SHAREHOLDER 
The percentage ownership by the largest shareholder. 
TOP10 A Herfindahl index that measures the concentration of shares held by the top 10 
stockholders excluding the controlling one. 
AUDITOR A dummy variable taking the value of one if the auditor is one of the 10 biggest auditors 
by market share. 
BOARDSIZE The log of number of board members. 
INDEPENDENT The percentage of independent directors. 
SIZE The log of total assets. 
LEV The ratio of debt to total assets. 
GROWTH The annual average sales growth in the three years prior to the date of the financial fraud. 
LOSS A dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm has recorded a loss in each of the 
prior two years, zero otherwise. 
MINDEX is a market development score. It is a comprehensive index to capture the regional market 
development from the following aspects: (1) the relations between government and 
markets, such as the role of markets in allocating resources and enterprises’ burden in 
addition to normal taxes; (2) the development of non-state business, such as ratio of 
industrial output by the private sector to total industrial output; (3) development of product 
markets, such as regional trade barriers; (4) development of factor markets such as FDI 
and mobility of labor; (5) development of market intermediaries and the legal environment 
(such as the protection of property rights). 
MLEGAL is the fifth sub-index of MINDEX, which represents development of market 




Table 1 Descriptive statistics for regulatory enforcements during the 1999-2011 period 
 
This table describes the statistics for regulatory enforcement in China. We collect 965 regulatory 
enforcement announcements made by CSRC, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange during the period 2003-2011.  
 
Panel A: by year and stock exchange 
Year 
Shanghai  Shenzhen  Total 
Number Percentage  Number Percentage  Number Percentage 
2003 20 0.021  19 0.020  39 0.040 
2004 22 0.023  22 0.023  44 0.046 
2005 65 0.067  65 0.067  130 0.135 
2006 46 0.048  62 0.064  108 0.112 
2007 47 0.049  78 0.081  125 0.129 
2008 29 0.030  68 0.070  97 0.100 
2009 55 0.057  109 0.113  164 0.170 
2010 47 0.049  88 0.091  135 0.140 
2011 33 0.034  91 0.094  124 0.128 
Total 364 0.377  602 0.623  966 1.000 
 
Panel B: by industry 






Ratio of number of firms with 
cases to total number of firm in 
the industry 
Agriculture A 42 0.126 0.346 
Mining B 23 0.077 0.200 
Food, beverage C0 44 0.074 0.278 
Textile/Apparel C1 43 0.074 0.224 
Timber, furniture C2 2 0.041 0.182 
Paper making, printing C3 21 0.076 0.298 
Petroleum, chemistry, plastics C4 107 0.068 0.237 
Electronics C5 25 0.037 0.130 
Metal, non-metal C6 84 0.067 0.222 
Machinery, equipment, 
instrument C7 136 0.057 0.168 
Medicine, biological product C8 64 0.069 0.225 
Other manufacturing 
industries C9 11 0.065 0.161 
Power, gas and water D 21 0.036 0.203 
Construction E 21 0.066 0.161 
 
 28 
Transportation F 28 0.049 0.179 
IT G 75 0.073 0.172 
Retail H 41 0.048 0.235 
Real estate J 84 0.103 0.432 
Social service K 32 0.070 0.211 
Communication L 12 0.093 0.185 
Conglomerate M 50 0.075 0.338 
Total  966 0.066 0.218 
We use the CSRC (Chinese Securities Regulation Commission) industry classification standard. 
As most of firms belong to the Manufacturing industry whose code begins with ‘C’, we use the 
first two codes to classify these samples. Our sample does not include the financial industry 
whose code begins with ‘I’.  
 





Number of occurrences Ratio of fraud cases 
Shanghai 10.972 14.774 53 0.039 
Zhejiang 10.760 12.054 70 0.060 
Guangdong 10.476 11.374 137 0.075 
Jiangsu 9.833 9.727 41 0.038 
Beijing 9.098 8.159 45 0.042 
Fujian 9.073 6.461 46 0.098 
Tianjin 9.031 9.059 26 0.099 
Shandong 8.360 6.611 56 0.065 
Liaoning 8.152 6.629 27 0.059 
Chongqing 7.734 5.042 19 0.079 
Sichuan 7.203 5.358 56 0.095 
Anhui 7.127 5.083 25 0.051 
Hubei 6.951 5.154 36 0.063 
Henan 6.826 4.509 16 0.043 
Hunan 6.758 4.108 56 0.127 
Hebei 6.748 4.886 19 0.059 
Jiangxi 6.721 4.304 6 0.026 
Jilin 6.370 4.911 23 0.081 
Hainan 6.313 3.770 18 0.095 
Guangxi 6.048 3.891 24 0.108 
Neimenggu 5.948 4.324 9 0.055 
Heilongjiang 5.830 5.194 25 0.100 
Shanxi 5.781 4.400 8 0.031 
Yunnan 5.642 4.041 10 0.047 
Ningxia 5.367 3.451 11 0.109 
Xinjiang 5.138 4.569 16 0.059 
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Guizhou 5.079 3.249 11 0.068 
Shaanxi 5.032 4.283 31 0.121 
Gansu 4.821 3.277 27 0.153 
Qinghai 4.111 2.320 16 0.186 
Xizang 3.236 3.523 3 0.039 
 





Table 2 Breakdown of enforcement actions by type of violation 
 
Panel A: By type of violation 
 Number of occurrences  Percentage 
Illegal share buybacks  146 0.101 
Inflated profits  82 0.057 
Fabrication of assets  19 0.013 
Unauthorized change in use of funds  25 0.017 
Postponement/delay in disclosure  366 0.253 
False statements  162 0.112 
Violations of fund provisions  4 0.003 
Major information omission  234 0.161 
Assets of listed firms occupied by the largest shareholders 74 0.051 
Stock price manipulation 12 0.008 
Illegal loan guarantee  43 0.030 
Speculation  14 0.010 
Others 268 0.185 
Total  1449 1.000 
 
Panel B: by type of enforcement action 
 Number of occurrences  Percentage  
Public criticism  186 0.147 
Public condemnation  244 0.192 
Administrative penalty  44 0.035 
Initiation of investigation 135 0.106 
Warning 184 0.145 
Fine 233 0.184 
Others  242 0.191 




Table 3 Summary Statistics of Main Variables 
This table reports the summary statistics of main variables used in the following regression analysis. Variables are as 
defined in Appendix A. 
 
 N Mean std min P25 Median P75 Max 
POLITICAL CONNECTION 11396 0.257  0.437  0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
% shares held by 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 11396 8.709  14.460  0.000 0.004  1.323  11.102  76.204  
% shares held by MUTUAL FUND 11396 7.687  13.368  0.000 0.001  0.909  9.131  61.553  
% shares held by SECURITY 
COMPANY 11396 0.131  0.583  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 18.229  
% shares held by INSURANCE 
COMPANY 11396 0.335  1.206  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 20.828  
% shares held by SOCIAL 
SECURITY FUND 11396 0.315  1.191  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 19.501  
% shares held by QFII 11396 0.241  1.149  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 27.297  
% shares held by LARGEST 
SHAREHOLDER 11396 37.670  16.091  0.82 25 35.53 50.03 89.41 
TOP10 11396 0.017  0.025  0.000  0.001  0.006  0.024  0.194  
AUDITOR 11396 0.161  0.368  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BOARD SIZE 11396 2.234  0.216  1.099  2.197  2.197  2.398  3.219  
INDEPENDENT 11396 0.352  0.067  0.000  0.333  0.333  0.375  0.714  
SIZE 11396 21.588  1.233  10.842  20.795  21.486  22.257  28.282  
LEV 11396 0.529  0.267  0.052  0.373  0.519  0.650  2.224  
GROWTH 11396 0.282  0.656  -0.609  0.044  0.168  0.331  5.134  
LOSS 11396 0.038  0.192  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 




Table 4 Main regression results 
The table reports the results of a probit regression model as follows: 
FRAUD = β0 + β1POLITICAL CONNECTION + β2INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS  
+ β3LARGEST SHAREHOLDER + β4TOP10 + β5AUDITOR + β6BOARDSIZE  
+ β7INDEPEDENT + β8SIZE + β9LEV + β10GROWTH + β11LOSS  
+ β12MINDEX+Industry and Year dummies 
The constant term, industry dummies, and year dummies are included in the regression but not reported. The 
p-values, which are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, are presented in parentheses below the estimates, where 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
POLITICAL CONNECTION  -0.282** 
(0.014) 















SECURITY COMPANY    -0.031 (0.997) 
 0.002 
(0.000) 
INSURANCE COMPANY    -4.551 (0.363) 
 -4.583 
(0.360) 
SOCIAL SECURITY FUND    -1.434 (0.788) 
 -1.545 
(0.772) 































































































































Sample size 11396 11396 11396 11396 11396 11396 
Adj-R2 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
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Table 5 Regression results between SOEs and non-SOEs 
 
This table examines the association between political connection, institutional investors and fraud under different 
ownership. We investigate the ownership of listed firms in China based on the identity of the largest shareholder, 
that is, the ultimate owner, following the recent literature. We classify our sample based on whether the firm is 
government controlled (SOEs) or not (non-SOEs). The constant term, industry dummies, and year dummies are 
included in the regression but not reported. The p-values, which are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, are 
presented in parentheses below the estimates, where *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Please refer to Table 4 for the model specification. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
 SOEs  Non-SOEs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 

















SECURITY COMPANY  -10.24 (0.499) 
-10.27 
(0.498) 




INSURANCE COMPANY  -4.106 (0.560) 
-4.109 
(0.560) 




SOCIAL SECURITY FUND  -0.807 (0.912) 
-0.822 
(0.911) 




QFII  -8.609 (0.356) 
-8.603 
(0.356) 































































































































Sample size 7553 7553 7553  3843 3843 3843 




Table 6 Regression results for partitioned sample by legal environment level 
 
This table investigates the role of political connection and institutional investors could be conditional on institutional 
environment. We partition our sample based on an index MLEGAL, which captures the development of the legal 
environment, such as the protection of property rights. The constant term, industry dummies, and year dummies are 
included in the regression but not reported. The p-values, which are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, are 
presented in parentheses below the estimates, where *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Please refer to Table 4 for the model specification. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
 Strong legal environment  Weak legal environment 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 





































































































































































Sample size 5650 5650 5650  5746 5746 5746 
Adj-R2 0.044 0.044 0.045  0.050 0.051 0.052 
 
 
